On a bright Arizona morning in March 2022, Rockies owner Dick Monfort introduced Kris Bryant, touting him as the team’s next great star and adding a bold prediction.
“Just so many things make this feel really, really right,” Monfort said at the team’s Salt River Fields complex. “We’re extremely excited to have Kris with us for the next seven years, and to help us win that elusive World Series that we are all looking for.”
Monfort, who steered the negotiations toward a seven-year, $182 million deal with agent Scott Boras, was betting big on the 30-year-old Bryant, the 2016 National League MVP who helped the Chicago Cubs break a 108-year championship drought.
Moments after Bryant slipped on a Rockies jersey for the first time, he made a bold statement of his own.
“I take a lot of pride (in) the fact that I’ve never played on a losing team in the big leagues,” he said, “and I don’t plan on doing that.”
Two injury-plagued seasons later, Bryant has played on two, with the Rockies topping 100 losses this season for the first time in their 31-year history.
Bryant’s contract, the largest free-agent deal in franchise history, now weighs heavily on the payroll of a mid-market franchise that can ill afford such costly mistakes. The deal stands in direct contrast to the draft-and-develop ethos the club has long identified with. It’s also emblematic of a perception that has hovered over the Rockies throughout much of their history: that they lack the vision, creativity and wherewithal to construct and nurture a consistent winner.
Some of baseball’s most successful franchises are synonymous with doing exactly that. New York has the Yankee Way. St. Louis, the Cardinal Way. But what exactly is the Rockie Way?
The Denver Post interviewed more than 30 sources in and around baseball, including former Rockies players and staff, agents, general managers and others across the game, in an effort to answer that question. Nearly all of those interviewed spoke on the condition of anonymity because they either still conduct business with the team or have relationships with Rockies staff members. Monfort declined to be interviewed for this story, and team president Greg Feasel spoke on background only and declined to be quoted directly.
What emerged from The Post’s reporting is the picture of a franchise regarded as among the most insular in the majors, that lags behind the industry’s most innovative front offices and remains stuck in a middle ground between going all-in for a championship and rebuilding its roster without ever fully committing to either.
While fans continue to flock to Coors Field, the on-field product is sub-par largely because the Rockies, rarely aggressive in free agency and historically reluctant to make big trades, have failed to develop their homegrown talent.
Many who deal with the franchise say Monfort remains the real power in the organization — a hands-on owner who drives the biggest and most critical decisions that shape the franchise. As the Bryant signing showed, Monfort is not afraid to spend money. The problem is his largest expenditures have failed to produce wins.
The Rockies insist that a corps of talented, young position players is ready to blossom, but a lack of quality pitching at the major- and minor-league level makes success look far away.
It’s a baseball team stuck in limbo.
“They won’t utter the ‘rebuilding’ word; in fact, quite the opposite because they remarkably thought they would be improved this season,” said Denver resident Dan Evans, a former Dodgers general manager who also held front-office roles with four other big league clubs.
“When Monfort told a Greeley gathering in late January that the 2023 Rockies had ‘a lot of talent,’ hinting they would contend for a playoff spot with predictions of a .500 or better outcome, was it malarkey or are their decision-makers incapable of accurately evaluating their organization? Both are disturbing.”
An insular franchise
At the top levels of the front office, the Rockies have long looked to the people already working at 20th and Blake to solve their problems.
When longtime general manager Dan O’Dowd resigned in October 2014, farm director Jeff Bridich, O’Dowd’s protégé, was promoted to replace him. At 37, Bridich was the youngest GM at the time. When Bridich resigned in April 2021 amid a contentious front-office shakeup, Colorado stayed in-house again and promoted Bill Schmidt to GM. He had previously led the Rockies’ scouting department since 1999.
The Rockies originally said they would look outside the organization, but after Schmidt’s five-month stint as the interim GM, Feasel and Monfort determined Schmidt was the right man for the job.
“It was what he did over the (five) months and then it just kept building, and I mean, really, he didn’t give us a choice,” Feasel said when Schmidt was named the permanent GM near the end of the 2021 season. “The intent was that we were going to go outside. But how many times do you need to be hit over the head with a bat?”
Still, the hiring followed a familiar theme for the Rockies: a penchant for promoting from within that critics argue limits creativity and deprives the team of a new direction.
“The Rockies haven’t had a ton of success but they haven’t looked for outside help or perspective,” said a former big-league GM and longtime front office staffer who declined to be named because he still works with MLB franchises. “A lot of teams are trying to poach (front-office) people from other successful organizations. You never really see that with them. It’s curious.”
The Baltimore Orioles, Houston Astros and Atlanta Braves are among the teams that looked outside their own walls for new general managers and reaped the rewards.
The Rockies, however, prefer to stay in-house. And in the family.
The promotion of Sterling Monfort to director of professional scouting in 2021 fell in line with that pattern. Sterling, 32, is Monfort’s second-oldest son. Walker Monfort, 36, has worked for the Rockies since 2009 and has been the Rockies’ vice president of corporate partnerships since 2014.
Manager Bud Black, who led the team to back-to-back playoff appearances in 2017-18, has now captained five consecutive losing seasons, but he’s under contract through 2024 and his job is secure.
“It’s kind of looked at as a weird place,” said one former Rockie who requested anonymity because he still works in the game and has numerous friends in the organization. “I didn’t realize that until I got out of there and saw how things were done in other places. It’s one of those seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees type of things.
“The biggest reason, I think, is just how insular they are. They stick with what they’ve got. That’s the thing I hear most often. They don’t think anybody else can figure out playing at altitude, so they think, ‘We’ll stick with what we’ve got.'”
Changing the course
Other teams are not nearly as patient, but then, they don’t play home games a mile above sea level.
Sports Illustrated senior writer Tom Verducci, among many others, believes the Rockies face a difficult, unique challenge, no matter who they hire in the front office.
“It’s harder to put together winning teams at altitude, so I don’t think that they can follow the same model as any other franchise,” Verducci said. “I don’t think anybody has figured out how to win consistently at altitude. They have been at it for a long time and they really haven’t figured it out.
“I think that the Rockies start out with this huge hurdle in front of them that all of the other 29 teams don’t have.”
Indeed, the Rockies have tried numerous innovations over the years in an attempt to deal with the difficulties of fielding a team at 5,280 feet. In 2002, a baseball humidor was installed at Coors Field. In 2012, Colorado instituted a “paired pitching system” featuring four starters working on a 75-pitch limit and four “piggyback” relievers. The experiment was a disaster and part of the reason manager Jim Tracy resigned and walked away with $1.4 million remaining on his contract.
The Rockies have studied and charted weather patterns. They have crunched numbers for years attempting to hit better on the road. Before the 2022 season, in an attempt to solve the disparities between home/road pitching, the club employed an analytics study.
But two seasons later, Colorado’s splits at Coors Field vs. on the road remain pronounced. Its OPS at Coors Field is .773, seventh in the majors, but its road OPS is .650 (30th). Pitching is a disaster both at home (6.09 ERA, worst in the majors) and away (5.18, third-worst).
Still, Schmidt insists that those outside the walls at 20th and Blake don’t see the progress the Rockies are making.
“We have people going the same direction, pulling on the same rope,” he said. “You guys (in the media) maybe don’t see it, but we’re making progress. We are open to new ideas.”
Feasel believes the Rockies get an unfair rap. He noted that this summer the Rockies hired Doug Mylowe as the club’s new CFO and Hensley “Bam Bam” Meulens as hitting coach. Mylowe came over from the Los Angeles Angels, where he was the director of finance, and Meulens was the Yankees’ hitting coach last season and spent 10 years as a coach with the Giants before that.
Schmidt also said that bringing Clint Hurdle back into the fold has provided a fresh, outside perspective. Hurdle managed the Rockies from 2002 until he was fired in May 2009, then he managed the Pittsburgh Pirates from 2011 to ’19. He now travels between the Rockies’ four minor-league teams and their Arizona Complex League team, working with young players.
“Clint was away for (more than) a dozen years, so of course he’s going to come back with different ideas,” Schmidt said. “We are open to new ideas and open to learning new things. To say we’re not is not true.”
Monfort’s team
Ten years ago, Monfort told The Post that, based on his business model, a realistic goal for the Rockies is to make the playoffs “twice every five years.”
His blueprint has been to take occasional dips into the free-agent pool, spend within the parameters of a mid-market club, but pay to retain veterans he likes, such as outfielder Charlie Blackmon, who signed a six-year, $108 million contract extension in the spring of 2018.
“Dick is in charge, it’s his team, and he doesn’t really care what people outside the organization think,” said one agent, who spoke to The Post on condition of anonymity because he doesn’t want to damage his ability to negotiate deals with the team. “Say what you want about Dick, he’s been unbelievably consistent. He’s never wavered. He’s going to follow the same path every time. That’s his team, that’s his baby and those are his guys. He doesn’t like to be criticized but he hasn’t really wavered from his path.”
Not only was Monfort a driving force behind the Bryant signing, but multiple sources say he played a central role in the infamous Nolan Arenado trade that sent the All-Star third baseman to St. Louis in February 2021.
Recent evidence, however, suggests the franchise is starting to change how it operates under Schmidt.
At this summer’s trade deadline, the Rockies departed from their usual path and made several deals designed to rebuild pitching in the farm system and clear the way for promising rookies such as Nolan Jones, Hunter Goodman and Brenton Doyle to get extensive playing time.
A year after the club extended closer Daniel Bard with a two-year, $19 million contract rather than attempt to trade him, Schmidt dealt five veteran players with expiring contracts, including former All-Star first baseman C.J. Cron, in exchange for seven pitching prospects.
“I will say that Bill Schmidt has been pretty aggressive,” Blackmon said. “I think in the past, the Rockies have, for the most part, played their hand conservatively. There is nothing wrong with that, but I feel more of a sense of urgency (with Schmidt).”
Still, the Rockies continue to search for a winning formula that has eluded them.
They could look to the Orioles, who tanked, collected high draft picks, and made the most of those picks to build out a farm system that’s been ranked No. 1 by MLB Pipeline for four consecutive years. After losing more than 100 games three times from 2018-21, the Orioles cleaned house and started from scratch. They hired Mike Elias away from the World Series champion Astros to become their general manager.
After losing more than 100 games three times from 2018-21, the Orioles have ridden the third-lowest payroll in the majors ($71 million) to first place in the AL East.
But Monfort’s comments in the past indicate he will never follow Baltimore’s path.
“I guess the connotation on rebuilding is you just get rid of everybody,” Monfort told The Post in January. “You try to draft low, which we’re not (going to do). We’re not trying to get the first pick. We’re not going to tank. We never have, never will.”
Monfort has admitted he tends to be loyal to a fault and that it pains him to see players depart. Yet at a time when loyalty would have made the most sense, the Rockies changed course. Instead of re-signing All-Star second baseman DJ LeMahieu — a keystone on the field and in the clubhouse when the Rockies came one victory away from claiming their first National League West crown in 2018 — the Rockies let LeMahieu walk.
He ended up signing a two-year, $24 million contract with the Yankees. The Rockies replaced him with declining veteran Daniel Murphy under the same terms. Monfort later admitted that the Rockies made a mistake.
“(The Rockies) don’t seem to have really clear goals, other than trying to win,” said Dan Szymborski, a senior writer for FanGraphs who’s been a harsh critic of the Rockies. “They really don’t seem to have a plan to get there. They are never really in win-now mode and never truly in win-later mode.”
Draft and develop
The Rockies’ recent futility has provided plenty of high draft choices but that hasn’t transferred to success at the big-league level.
Evans doubts things will change.
“They constantly refer to themselves as a draft and develop organization, but despite drafting in the top 10 spots in the first round in nine of the last 12 years, the Rockies have sputtered trying to produce quality big-league players from the amateur market,” he said.
The Rockies disagree, saying that rookie shortstop Ezequiel Tovar, along with the outfield trio of Jones, Doyle and Goodman, have a chance to be impactful big-leaguers. But injuries have left the minor league pitching cupboard bare. Hence Schmidt’s flurry of trades for pitching prospects this summer.
Colorado’s farm system is ranked 17th by FanGraphs, 18th by ESPN.com and MLB Pipeline, and 20th by Baseball America.
“I understand why we’re ranked that way, because a lot of our pitchers got hurt,” said Schmidt, noting that three of the club’s top pitching prospects underwent Tommy John surgery this summer. “But I think our position players rank up there with anybody.”
Schmidt notes that Colorado has beefed up its Latin American program in recent years and believes it’s starting to pay off. Pushed by Rolando Fernandez, the vice president of international scouting and development, the Rockies in 2018 followed the lead of other franchises and added a second team to the Dominican Summer League.
“We are seeing some young players coming up, with Tovar leading the charge. I think we are improving,” Schmidt said. “But we haven’t gotten the pitching up here that we need to out of the Latin program. That’s still developing.”
Yet while bigger-market teams have been active in signing talented Asian players — Los Angeles Angels superstar Shohei Ohtani being the prime example — the Rockies have waved the white flag.
“It’s about where you put your resources, and we have put more into Venezuela, Mexico and the Dominican Republic,” Schmidt explained. “We feel like we have a better chance there. It’s difficult to go head-to-head when you’re talking about the Mets and Yankees, Red Sox and Dodgers; those kinds of teams.”
In the research and development game, the Rockies are still playing catch-up.
Following the pandemic-shortened 2020 season, Brittany Haby, manager of baseball research, was the only one left in her department after the rest of the staff quit.
Since then, Colorado has beefed up its department to 11. Brian Jones, the team’s video coordinator for 16 years, was promoted to director of R&D before this season. While Jones says there is a plan to add more people, the Rockies continue to lag behind the rest of the majors. The average team has 14 analysts and nine engineers, according to Four Rings Sports Solutions. The small-market Rays have an MLB-high 44.
Following the lead of other franchises, the Rockies now have a video/analytics coordinator at every level of the minors and they now travel with the team. They are also currently constructing an analytics-specific building called “The Lab” at Salt River Fields; a place where players can measure and evaluate their performance and study their biomechanics.
Coors Field fandom
If there is one thing the Rockies do very well, it’s drawing fans to Coors Field.
The stadium is a clean, well-maintained, family-friendly venue that’s become not just the epicenter of Lodo, but a tourist destination for baseball fans across the country. When the Rockies host popular teams such as the Cubs, Cardinals, Red Sox and Yankees, their fans fill the ballpark. When the Yankees came to Denver in mid-July for a weekend series, all three games were sellouts.
In spite of their terrible record, the Rockies are averaging 31,984 per game this season, ranking 14th in the majors and down only slightly from the 32,467 average from last season.
The Rockies also do a good job pairing promotional events with less attractive opponents. For example, for an Aug. 19 game against the lowly White Sox, the team gave away Todd Helton jerseys as part of its 30th anniversary celebration. The Saturday night game drew 46,601.
But many fans, especially those who care about wins and losses, are disgruntled. In a recent Denver Post survey, 81.33% of fans who responded said they attended fewer games this season because the team’s personnel decisions made the Rockies a non-competitive team.
When asked how their view of Monfort affected their attitude toward the club, 54.73% said their support declined because of ownership.
“The Rockies are more concerned with making the summer about a ‘pleasurable and inexpensive family experience,'” said Mark Findley, a longtime Rockies fan and former baseball coach at Loveland and Fossil Ridge high schools. “The ballpark is the star attraction and it’s like, ‘come and drink at the state’s best outdoor bar.’
“If the Rox win, great. If they lose, it’s, ‘Oh well, they tried hard and we had fun at the ballpark.’ ”
Into the future
So where do the Rockies go from here? Even though the team will get a high draft pick next summer by virtue of its 100-loss season, its future is tied to Bryant.
His contract will be on the books through 2028, which is one of the reasons why, when the deal was announced, esteemed ESPN baseball writer and TV analyst Buster Olney tweeted: “On a scale of 1 to 10, the industry shock over the Rockies’ deal with Kris Bryant has been turned up to 11.”
ESPN baseball analyst Eduardo Perez, who played 13 seasons in the majors and coached for the Astros and Marlins, said the Bryant signing was “a little bit confusing.”
“At the time, we all thought the Rockies were rebuilding,” Perez said. “It made a lot of people in the industry happy that Kris got that money, and made a lot of people confused.”
Schmidt, who once referred to Bryant as the Rockies’ “aircraft carrier,” predicts that once Bryant is fully healthy, he’ll be a player the Rockies can build around.
“He’ll provide a veteran presence for our young players as they come up here,” Schmidt said. “And I have no doubt that he has productive seasons left on the field.”
But, so far, the Bryant deal has been a disaster, with five years and $136 million still remaining on the contract.
Injuries have limited him to less than 40% of the Rockies’ games since he signed, and he hit just 15 homers in his first 119 games with a home run rate (2.9%) that pales in comparison to what he did with the Cubs (5.6%) during his MVP season seven years ago.
Recently, Bryant returned to the lineup after another long spell on the injured list and showed flashes of his talent. But at that point, the Rockies had already been mathematically eliminated from playoff contention for a fifth straight season.
And the success he and Monfort promised on that bright spring morning in the desert seemed as distant as ever.
NL West drafts 2008-21
If you’re on the mobile app, tap here to see the chart.
| Rockies | Dodgers | Giants | Padres | Dbacks | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|||||
| # Picks | 560 | 547 | 548 | 556 | 564 |
| Big-leaguers w/club | 59 | 47 | 58 | 48 | 55 |
| Big-leaguers overall | 76 | 96 | 83 | 97 | 91 |
| Hit rate w/club | 10.54% | 8.59% | 10.58% | 8.63% | 9.75% |
| Hit rate overall | 13.57% | 17.55% | 15.15% | 17.45% | 16.13% |
| Multi-year starters | 15 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 14 |
| All-star noms | 12 | 11 | 12 | 0 | 10 |
| Gold Gloves | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| Silver Sluggers | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 4 |
| MVPs | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total WAR for club | 154.4 | 110.5 | 147.6 | 21.9 | 106.3 |
| Average WAR for club | 2.62 | 2.35 | 2.54 | 0.46 | 1.93 |
| Total WAR overall | 257.4 | 241.5 | 216 | 195.4 | 247.5 |
| Average WAR overall | 3.39 | 2.52 | 2.60 | 2.01 | 2.72 |
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